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Arbitration. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n v. J. Stog Tec GMBH, 809
A.2d 468 (R.I. 2002). An arbitration award, which has been ap-
pealed, is not a final judgment. Therefore, postjudgment interest
may not accrue until any appeal is completed.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1993, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agree-
ment, which the plaintiff unilaterally terminated.' Under the
terms of the agreement, the case was sent to an arbitrator who
ruled in favor of the defendant on June 26, 1998.2 The arbitrator's
award included $339,300 in interest.3 On September 15, 1998, the
arbitrator added $162,000 in attorney's fees to this award. 4 The
plaintiff filed an action in August 1998 seeking to vacate the award
and the defendant filed a motion in September 1998 to confirm it.5
After appeal, on April 3, 2001, the superior court entered judgment
in favor of the defendant in the amount of $1,188,091.74, plus 12%
interest from June 26, 1998, the date of the arbitration award. 6
The plaintiff responded by filing a motion for relief from judg-
ment under rule 60(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. 7 The plaintiff argued "that interest should not
have been compounded on the prejudgment interest already as-
sessed by the arbitrator."" The defendant argued this was
postjudgment interest since the arbitration award was a judg-
ment.9 On April 18, 2001, the motion justice ruled in favor of the
plaintiff in holding that an arbitration award on appeal is not an
entry of judgment for purposes of a statutory interest
assessment.10
On April 30, 2001, the motion justice published the amended
final judgment, which included the following modifications: the
plaintiff should pay the defendant prejudgment interest on the
principal of the arbitrator's award for the time period of June 26,
1. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n v. J. Stog Tec GMBH, 809 A.2d 468, 469 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 469-70.
10. Id. at 470.
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1998 to April 3, 2001; the plaintiff shall pay prejudgment interest
on the award of attorney's fees for the time period of September 15,
1998 to April 3, 2001; and that the plaintiff shall pay postjudgment
interest from April 3, 2001, until the award is paid at the statutory
rate of 12% on the total amount of the judgment." Defendant
appealed.12
BACKGROUND
Section 9-21-10(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws states
that "Postjudgment interest shall be calculated at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum and accrue on both the principal
amount of the judgment and the prejudgment interest entered
therein. This section shall not apply until entry of
judgment .... -11a
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The judgment referred to in section 9-21-10(a) is a final judg-
ment "'that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties.'" 14 Only
after the entrance of such a final judgment can postjudgment in-
terest accrue.1 5 A final judgment "occurs when the [trial] court en-
ters judgment, if the debtor has not filed a timely notice of appeal
or when [the supreme court] affirms the judgment on appeal,
whatever event first occurs." 16 In calculating interest, the court
may not compound prejudgment interest on the prejudgment inter-
est awarded by the arbitrator.17
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held when a party appeals
an arbitration award, postjudgment interest begins to accrue only
on the affirmation of the judgment on appeal. The court reasoned
a final judgment only occurs upon either the entry of an unap-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10(a) (1997).
14. Bradford, 809 A.2d at 471 (quoting Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron, Inc. v.
Pinkerton, Inc., 494 A.2d 897, 898 (R.I. 1985)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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pealed final judgment or the affirmation of the judgment on
appeal.
Dana John Gravina
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Arbitration. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tavarez, 797 A.2d
480 (R.I. 2002). The court has authority to review an arbitration
award when the arbitration takes place pursuant to a court order.
In such cases, the court may add prejudgment interest to an arbi-
tration award, as well as costs, even though the arbitration award
did not include these sums and their inclusion causes the judgment
to exceed the policy limits. Prejudgment interest begins to accrue
on the date the insurance company wrongfully denies the claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 18, 1993, Ronald Steele and Troy Perry, while
driving an uninsured vehicle, shot and killed the insured, Bartolo
Tavarez. 1 The plaintiff had issued a motor vehicle insurance pol-
icy to the insured.2 The defendant, the insured's father, submitted
a claim to the plaintiff seeking benefits under the uninsured mo-
torist policy, based on his son's death.3 When the plaintiff rejected
the claim, the defendant requested arbitration, which was pro-
vided for under the terms of the policy.4 On July 25, 1996, the
plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the court to
find that the insured was not entitled to payment under the pol-
icy.5 The superior court ruled in favor of the defendant and the
plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. 6 Prior to the appeal being
docketed, the defendant again requested arbitration.7 The plain-
tiff refused, but was ordered, to arbitrate by the superior court.8
The superior court stayed the execution of any arbitration award
until the supreme court had decided the plaintiffs appeal concern-
ing the declaratory judgment.9 The plaintiff then filed a motion
with the supreme court, which was denied, arguing the arbitration
was a waste of time and should be stayed.' 0
On December 3, 1999, the arbitration panel awarded $300,000
to defendant, the maximum amount recoverable under the pol-
l. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tavarez, 797 A.2d 480, 482 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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icy." In July 2000, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
superior court's declaratory judgment. 12 The plaintiff then sought
to confirm the arbitration award while the defendant sought to
have prejudgment interest and costs added to the arbitration
award. 13 The superior court awarded $210,000 in prejudgment in-
terest for the period of December 18, 1993, the date Bartolo
Tavarez was killed, to October 29, 1999, the date the arbitration
hearing commenced. 14 The superior court also awarded $45,900 in
postjudgment interest on the subtotal of $510,000, which reflects
the initial arbitration award and the prejudgment interest on that
award. 15 Lastly, the superior court awarded costs, which included
expert witness fees. 16 Plaintiff appealed.' 7
BACKGROUND
Section 9-30-8 of the Rhode Island General Laws states, "Fur-
ther relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor
[sic] shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the
relief."i8
Section 9-21-10(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws provides
that:
In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision
made for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the
clerk of the court to the amount of damages interest at a rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum thereon from the date the
cause of action accrued, which shall be included on the judg-
ment entered therein. 19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island courts have extremely limited authority in
reviewing the merits of an arbitration award. 20 However, the arbi-
11. Id. at 482-83.
12. Id. at 483.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 486 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-8 (1997)).
19. Id. at 487 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10(a) (1997)).
20. Id. at 487.
SURVEY SECTION
tration in this case did not occur under the arbitration agreement
in the policy and hence the superior court's review was not a mere
confirmation of an arbitration award. 21 The plaintiff arbitrated
the dispute only when ordered to do so, by the superior court, in
the declaratory judgment.22 Pursuant to the declaratory judg-
ment, the superior court retained jurisdiction over the declaratory
judgment action and, therefore, had the ability to issue supplemen-
tary relief under section 9-30-8.23 The superior court also "stayed
the result of any arbitration pending [the supreme court's] decision
on the coverage of the policy, clearly contemplating further court
action under the declaratory [ I judgment suit."2 4 The interest
awarded by the superior court constitutes further relief in the de-
claratory judgment action under section 9-30-8.25
The supreme court in Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Skaling I),26
stated that the intent of the legislature in passing prejudgment in-
terest statutes was to encourage the early settlement of claims. 27
In Skaling I, the supreme court "fashioned judicially created reme-
dies designed to compensate insured claimants for the 'stone-
walling' and delaying tactics of insurance companies ....-" 28 Under
Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Skaling II),29 the plaintiffs repeated at-
tempts to avoid providing coverage to the insured in this case was
held to be a breach of contract. 30
The superior court erred in calculating prejudgment inter-
est.31 Under section 9-21-10(a), the interest clock begins running
on the date when the cause of action accrues.3 2 The date the cause
of action accrued was not the date when Bartolo Tavarez was
killed, but rather, the date when the plaintiff wrongfully denied
the claim. 33 Therefore, prejudgment interest should be calculated
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 485.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 486.
26. 742 A.2d 282, 292 (R.I. 1999).
27. Tavarez, 797 A.2d at 486 (citing Skaling 1, 742 A.2d at 292).
28. Id. at 484 (citing Skaling 1, 742 A.2d at 292).
29. 799 A.2d 997 (R.I. 2002).
30. Tavarez, 797 A.2d at 486-87 (citing Skaling H, 799 A.2d at 1003).
31. Id. at 487.
32. Id.
33. Id.
2003] 435
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from May 3, 1996 not December 18, 1993. 34 The superior court
also erred in compounding the prejudgment interest by awarding
postjudgment interest on the prejudgment interest, and in award-
ing expert witness fees as costs. 35
CONCLUSION
Because the arbitration occurred pursuant to a court order
and not under the terms of the policy, the superior court had au-
thority to review the arbitration award. Therefore, the superior
court did not err in adding prejudgment interest and costs to the
arbitration award even though the inclusion of these amounts
caused the judgment to exceed the policy limits. However, the
court did err in the method of calculating these costs. Prejudgment
interest begins to accrue when the insurance company wrongfully
denies the claim.
Dana John Gravina
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id.
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Arbitration. School Committee v. Crouch, 808 A.2d 1074 (R.I.
2002). When a statute provides a specific administrative remedy
for employees to invoke when challenging a for-cause termination,
but also allows the parties to elect arbitration, the arbitration
agreement must be specific about which types of disputes are cov-
ered by the agreement otherwise the statute will prevail.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Crouch was terminated as a principal in the Town of North
Kingstown school system when he admitted stealing the prescrip-
tion drug Ritalin from students at the school.' Prior to his dismis-
sal, Crouch was employed as a tenured teacher and a school
principal in the Town of North Kingstown. 2 Following his dismis-
sal as principal, the school committee also voted to dismiss Crouch
as a tenured teacher.3 Crouch appealed the decision pursuant to
section 16-13-4(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws; he also filed a
grievance under the arbitration provisions in a collective bargain-
ing agreement (CBA) between the town and the union.4
The trial court found that the arbitration provisions in the
CBA did not clearly cover grievances arising out of for-cause termi-
nations of tenured teachers; therefore, the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction barring Crouch from proceeding to arbitrate his
dismissal.5
BACKGROUND
Section 16-13-4(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws states,
"Any teacher aggrieved by the decision of the school board shall
have the right of appeal to the department of elementary and sec-
ondary education and shall have the right of further appeal to the
superior court."6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Section 16-13-4(a) allows a tenured teacher the opportunity to
appeal a decision of the school board; however, the teacher's statu-
1. Sch. Comm. v. Crouch, 808 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1077.
6. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-13-4(a) (2001)).
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tory remedy is not necessarily exclusive. 7 In the present case, the
parties also agreed, in the CBA, to arbitrate certain matters.8
However, the language of the CBA did not state that the parties
agreed to arbitrate dismissals of tenured teachers for-cause.9 Arbi-
tration is a contractual matter; a party cannot be compelled to ar-
bitrate a matter to which the party did not agree. 10 In the instant
case, the parties were not clear as to whether dismissals of tenured
teachers for-cause were subject to the CBA. 11 In light of the spe-
cific statutory remedy provided, the court found that the provisions
of the statute should govern the more general provisions of the
CBA. 12 The court found support that the CBA was not intended to
include for-cause dismissals in a separate contract negotiated by
the school committee. 13 The separate contract explicitly allowed
arbitration for employees terminated for-cause.1 4 The presence of
this provision suggested that the parties knew how to include the
remedy if that was their intent.' 5
The court also addressed the election-of-remedies doctrine.16
The court found that by electing to pursue his statutory remedy
pursuant to section 16-13-4(a), Crouch waived any right he may
have had to pursue arbitration under the CBA.17 The statutory
appeal procedure does not allow a party to simultaneously pursue
both the statutory remedy and arbitration.18
CONCLUSION
When a statute provides a specific appellate procedure for em-
ployees to invoke when challenging a for-cause termination, but
also allows the parties to elect arbitration, the arbitration agree-
ment needs to be specific about which types of disputes are covered
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1075.
9. Id. at 1078.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1079.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1080.
16. Id. The election-of-remedies doctrine allows the plaintiff to choose which
available remedy to pursue, but does not allow the pursuit of multiple remedies
simultaneously. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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by the arbitration agreement. If the arbitration provisions do not
contain the specific dispute in question, the statutory remedy will
govern the more general provisions of the arbitration agreement.
In addition, the election-of-remedies doctrine prohibits a party
from simultaneously pursuing both a statutory remedy and
arbitration.
Amy Hughes
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Arbitration. Purvis Systems Inc. v. American Systems Corp.,
788 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 2002). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that a supplemental arbitration award including the payment of
attorney's fees by the losing party was valid even though it was
added after the original award had been declared.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1997, Purvis Systems, Inc. (Purvis) and American Systems
Corporation (ASC) entered into a subcontract in which Purvis was
the general contractor and ASC was the subcontractor.1 A dispute
arose between the parties at which point Purvis filed a demand for
arbitration to determine the rights of the parties. 2 The arbitrator
found in favor of ASC and ordered Purvis to pay the fees and ex-
penses of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) as well as
the arbitrator in accordance with the parties' contract that pro-
vided the losing party would bear "all expenses of the arbitration."
No mention of attorney's fees was made in the arbitration award.4
ASC's attorney alerted the arbitrator that attorney's fees had
not been awarded. 5 He claimed the parties understood that the
contract required the payment of attorney's fees by the losing
party.6 Purvis disputed this view.7 Over a year after the original
hearing, the arbitrator modified the award and ordered Purvis to
pay ASC's attorney's fees.8
Purvis disputed the award of attorney's fees and filed a peti-
tion in superior court to vacate this part of the award. 9 The supe-
rior court vacated the award because the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law and the terms of the contract and did not state
the grounds for the award.10
1. Purvis Sys., Inc. v. Am. Sys. Corp., 788 A.2d 1112, 1113 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1113-14.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1114.
9. Id.
10. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
BACKGROUND
The court's role in reviewing arbitration awards is "extremely
limited.""I Under section 10-3-12 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, arbitration awards may be vacated in four circumstances in-
cluding instances involving procurement of the award by corrup-
tion, corruption or partiality of the arbitrator, where the
arbitrators exceed their power, or where the arbitrator behaves in
a way that substantially prejudices the rights of one of the par-
ties.12 In addition, case law states an award may be vacated if it is
irrational or the arbitrator "manifestly disregarded the law,"13 but
not if the arbitrator made a mistake of the law.14 If the award is
based on a plausible interpretation of the contract and it is within
the arbitrator's authority to decide the issue in question then the
award should be upheld.' 5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Purvis argued the arbitrator did not have the power to decide
the issue of attorney's fees or to modify the award. 16 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court found that the arbitrator did not exceed his
powers by deciding the issue of attorney's fees.' 7 AAA rules, the
language of the contract, and Purvis's demand for the arbitrator to
determine the parties' rights gave the arbitrator the authority to
interpret the meaning of the phrase in the subcontract that "all
expenses of the arbitration shall be assessed against the losing
party and that said expense may be added to any judgment that
may be entered."' 8 The supreme court also held that the arbitrator
had the power to modify the award because the arbitrator had not
addressed the issue of attorney's fees in the original award, which
left the issue unresolved. 19
11. Id. (quoting Romano v. Allstate Ins. Co., 458 A.2d 339, 341 (R.I. 1983)).
12. Id. at 1115 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-3-12 (2002)).
13. Id. (citing Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 687 A.2d 440, 442
(R.I. 1996)).
14. Id. (quoting Westminster Constr. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376 A.2d 708,
711 (R.I. 1977)).
15. Id. (quoting Jacinto v. Egan, 391 A.2d 1173, 1176 (R.I. 1978)).
16. Id. at 1115-16.
17. Id. at 1115.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1116-17.
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The court concluded that the superior court justice improperly
vacated the arbitrator's award of attorney's fees. 20 In light of the
limited review of arbitration awards, the court found that the su-
perior court justice substituted his own interpretation of the con-
tract for the arbitrator's decision. 21 The court based its decision on
the fact that the parties had contracted for binding arbitration 22
and the strong public policy in favor of the finality of arbitration
awards.23 The court also asserted that the arbitrator was not re-
quired to set out the grounds for awarding attorney's fees because
such a requirement "would undermine the very purpose of arbitra-
tion, which is to provide a relatively quick, efficient and informal
means of private dispute settlement."24
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an arbitrator in a
commercial dispute can award attorney's fees if the parties' con-
tract provides for this type of award. The arbitrator was allowed to
modify the previous award because the original award did not ad-
dress the issue of attorney's fees. The court overturned the supe-
rior court and reinstated the arbitrator's award.
Cassandra S. Shaffer
20. Id. at 1117.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1118.
24. Id. (quoting Westminster Constr. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376 A.2d 708,
710 (R.I. 1977)).
